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 Andreas Marchetti 
The European Neighbourhood Policy 
Foreign Policy at the EU’s Periphery 
Introduction
The French political scientist, physician, and author Jean-Christophe Rufin 
once stated that the “democratic civilisation cultivates the delicate privilege 
to know itself more mortal than all others.”
1 While his depiction of Western 
democracies as hypochondriacs appears to be somewhat far-reaching at 
first sight, the statement illustrates precisely one of the most prominent 
moods currently en vogue all over Europe, a Europe that does not yet seem 
to have overcome its identity crisis of the fin de millénaire. However wide-
spread this mood might be, its assumptions are all but true. Europe, as one 
of the figureheads of democracy, has lived through manifold crises during 
the past decades but has eventually resolved all of them successfully.
2 De-
spite this strength, the European Union is only slowly adopting a more ac-
tive international role, by spreading its values and influence piecemeal – 
but spreading them all the same. 
Even when focussing on the regional setting, the European Union still 
seems in a process of discovery just like it has discovered the relevance of 
“other vicinities” in the previous past. This cognitive process has always 
1   Jean-Christophe Rufin, La dictature libérale: Le secret de la toute-puissance des 
démocraties au 20
e siècle, Paris: Lattès 1994, p. 10 [transl. by author]. 
2   Cf. for the European integration process in particular Ludger Kühnhardt, European
Integration: Challenge and Response: Crises as Engines of Progress in European 
Integration History, Discussion Paper C 157, Bonn: ZEI 2006. Andreas Marchetti 
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been particularly observable either in the aftermath of enlarging the Com-
munity’s or later the Union’s own geographic scope or as a result of devel-
opments at its periphery that had caused direct repercussions on Europe 
itself. Among some of the most prominent adaptations features the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. It was mainly promoted by Southern EU-
members as a sort of geographic compensation for Eastern enlargement
3
barely a decade after Portugal and Spain had joined the European Commu-
nity in 1986. Analogously, the Northern Dimension was brought to life af-
ter Sweden and Finland had joined the Union. Even the establishment of 
the European Security and Defence Policy is largely owed to the impact of 
the violent dissolution of Yugoslavia and the failure of the EU to cope with 
the resulting wars and “ethnic cleansings”. Hence, the basic motives of the 
EU to establish special relations with neighbouring states can be regarded 
as two-fold: on the one hand, the EU endeavours to prevent developments 
in its geographic neighbourhood to negatively affect its security or prosper-
ity, on the other hand, the EU and particularly the member states geo-
graphically most concerned or most present in the respective areas actively 
attempt to maintain or even enlarge a certain sphere of influence in these 
areas.
4
Consequently, at the turn of the century it was only a matter of time until 
the EU began to formulate a new policy scheme with Eastern enlargement 
coming into perspective. The establishment of such a scheme follows the 
development of the EU’s foreign policy regime over the past decades. As 
the European integration process has first of all involved economics – ei-
ther for the sake of common welfare or for the sake of having economic 
integration help to create a pacified political Europe
5 – Europe’s foreign 
policy impact has largely and foremost been an economic one. The Union 
3    Cf. Jean-Pierre Chevènement, France – Allemagne: Parlons franc, Paris: Plon 
1996, p. 49. 
4   Cf. Raffaella A. Del Sarto/Tobias Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP: What’s at 
Stake with the European Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterra-
nean?”, in: European Foreign Affairs Review 10.1 (2005), p. 28. 
5   Cf. the discussion of the motives for the integration process in the 1950s by Andrew 
Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina 
to Maastricht, London: UCL Press 1998, p. 4f. European Neighbourhood Policy 
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as relevant foreign policy actor is internationally mainly recognised due to 
its foreign trade regime, its development co-operation and its monetary pol-
icy.
6 However, with the creation of the Common Foreign and Security Pol-
icy in Maastricht and the inauguration of the European Security and 
Defence Policy in Cologne, the Union is consistently acquiring the qualities 
of an increasingly multidimensional actor in contrast to its long-time role of 
a mainly economic actor.
7 This growing multidimensionality is rooted in 
the gradual shift in the Union’s self-understanding from an economic 
community to a community of values. This shift has already been reflected 
in the approach chosen within such foreign policy frameworks as the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership. With the EU maturing in terms of foreign pol-
icy, this increased comprehensiveness is bound to play an even more pro-
nounced role within the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). 
Establishing the European Neighbourhood Policy 
From “New Neighbourhood” to “European Neighbourhood” 
At the very beginning, the scheme now labelled the “European Neighbour-
hood Policy”
8 was conceptualized as policy towards the Union’s “new 
neighbours”. However natural such a terminology seemed with the latest 
enlargement under way it is rather astounding that more than a decade after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new states, the 
specification of relations to these sovereign entities should be referred to as 
“new”. In this sense, the initially coined term illustrates quite well the sense 
6   Cf. Wolfgang Wagner, Die Konstruktion einer europäischen Außenpolitik: 
Deutsche, französische und britische Ansätze im Vergleich, Studien der Hessischen 
Stiftung für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung 41, Frankfurt/New York: Campus 
2002, p. 18. 
7   Cf. the judgment of Roy H. Ginsberg, The European Union in International Poli-
tics: Baptism by Fire, Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield 2001, p. 9. 
8   The term “European” refers to the fact that it is an EU policy concerned with coun-
tries neighbouring the EU. It does not imply that the countries dealt with are ”Euro-
pean”, cf. for example the case of Morocco: being considered non-European, its 
application to become member of the European Community was rejected in 1987. Andreas Marchetti 
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of discovery on behalf of the EU
9 – a sense that was presumably aroused 
less with the profound changes in Eastern Europe, and more with the EU 
changing itself, i.e. with its biggest ever enlargement under way.
10
The first initiatives for the formulation of the new policy were tabled in 
early 2002.
11 Whereas a British initiative only considered a policy towards 
Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, a Swedish proposal already considered 
these countries plus Russia and the Southern Mediterranean,
12 an inclusive 
approach that was finally translated into the new policy. With the inclusion 
of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the ENP in June 2004, this new pol-
icy now encompasses most of the EU’s neighbouring countries either shar-
ing a land border or – as most Mediterranean partners – a sea border with 
the EU.
13 Russia remains an exception in this respect: relations between 
Russia and the EU continue to be managed bilaterally. Notwithstanding this 
“inconsistency”,
14 the ENP – put on track with the Commission’s Commu-
nication on Wider Europe in March 2003
15 – not only became the policy 
9   Cf. for an analogy of the EU’s foreign policy approach with the age of discoveries 
Ludger Kühnhardt, “Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie und Horizonterweiterung: Die 
EU entdeckt den Erweiterten Nahen Osten”, in: Franz Kernic/Gunther Hauser 
(eds.), Handbuch zur Europäischen Sicherheitspolitik, Frankfurt et al.: Peter Lang 
2005, pp. 273-283. 
10  Cf. Eckart D. Stratenschulte, “Das Brüsseler Illusionstheater – zu Gast in Osteuro-
pa”, in: Osteuropa 53.6 (2003), p. 764. 
11  These followed the call for a policy towards “all our neighbours” in: Commission of 
the European Communities, The Commission’s Work Programme for 2002,
COM(2001)620 final, http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/com/cnc/2001/com2001_0620 
en01.pdf.
12  Cf. in more detail Michele Comelli, “The Challenges of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy”, in: The International Spectator 39.3 (2004), pp. 98-101. 
13  Having already established closer ties to the EU than the ENP could possibly offer, 
the ENP does not include the current acceding or candidate countries (Bulgaria, 
Romania and Croatia, Turkey) nor the Western Balkan countries (considered poten-
tial candidate countries). It also does not govern relations with the Western Euro-
pean countries Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, nor with any of the European micro-
states (Andorra, Holy See, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino). 
14  Further down it will be discussed that this does not really constitute an inconsis-
tency if it comes to the logic of the ENP, cf. pp. 20ff. 
15   Commission of the European Communities, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A 
New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours,
COM(2003)104 final, http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/com03_104_en.pdf. European Neighbourhood Policy 
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scheme for the “new neighbours” but also the new framework for already 
established “neighbourhood” schemes such as the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership. As a matter of transparency, these policies are now being in-
corporated into the ENP together with most of their specific arrangements. 
The ENP as Policy Framework 
The basic principles and features of the EU’s neighbourhood policy are laid 
down in the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper (ENPSP), is-
sued by the Commission just a few days after enlarging the EU to 25 mem-
ber states in May 2004: The EU’s relations with the neighbouring countries 
involved are governed by contractual agreements. On their basis and in or-
der to address the particular needs of the different partners, the European 
Commission drafts individual Country Reports. The reports assess the cur-
rent state of relations as well as the political, social and economic devel-
opments and identify a first set of issues that will have to be addressed. By 
doing so, they serve as basis for specific Action Plans that are worked out 
in co-operation with the respective countries. These Plans finally constitute 
the points of reference for concrete implementation and assistance that is 
accompanied by joint monitoring of developments, aimed at improving the 
overall efficiency of ENP-measures.
16 Hence, the approach described in the 
strategy comprises four consecutive stages: 
1. Establishment of contractual relations with neighbours; 
2. Draft of Country Reports; 
3. Agreement and entering into force of Action Plans; 
4. Implementation and monitoring. 
So far, the sequence of these steps has been respected. Notwithstanding this 
common pattern for all ENP-partners, there exist two different types of 
agreements currently in place to govern relations with neighbours. This is 
due the fact that most of these agreements were concluded well before the 
16  Cf. Commission of the European Communities, European Neighbourhood Policy 
Strategy Paper, COM(2004)373 final, http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/ 
strategy/Strategy_Paper_EN.pdf, in particular pp. 2ff. and 7. Andreas Marchetti 
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inauguration of the ENP: With Eastern partners, the EU had negotiated 
Partnership and Co-operation Agreements,
17 with Mediterranean Partners, 
Association Agreements had been put in place. Besides this difference in 
denominations, the conclusion of the agreements and their entering into 
force took place over a period of more than ten years (see Table 1). Ac-
cordingly, the contents of the agreements vary to a considerable degree, 
even though they all comprise basic elements such as political dialogue or 
economic co-operation. 
The adaptation of older agreements to new circumstances and priorities is 
not yet on top of the agenda. Nonetheless, the ENPSP explicitly considers 
the later replacement of the existing agreements with European Neighbour-
hood Agreements
18 as unique contractual instruments of the ENP. This 
would substantially harmonise the contractual bases as well as consolidate 
the ENP as genuine framework. 
With the Country Reports or the Action Plans so far worked out, the EU – 
intending “to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines between the 
enlarged EU and its neighbours”
19 – also seems determined to decrease the 
divide between Southern and Eastern neighbours, until recently treated 
separately. The simultaneous release of Country Reports or Action Plans 
for Southern and Eastern partners alike bears witness to the strong com-
mitment to bring partners closer together. 
The Action Plans under the ENP-regime are tailored along a set of central 
lines: Based on a commitment to shared values, they contain specific po-
litical, economic and cultural provisions, drawing on all three pillars of the 
EU.
20 By doing so, the Union remains committed to the philosophy of its 
earlier   “neighbourhood  policies”  by  additionally reflecting  its  growing 
17  Besides the countries listed in Table 1, the EU also concluded PCAs with Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan (in force since July 1999) as well as with Russia (in 
force since December 1997) and Turkmenistan (signed in May 1998, not yet in 
force). Between the EU and Mongolia, a Trade and Co-operation Agreement en-
tered into force in March 1993. 
18  Cf. Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, as Fn. 16, p. 3. 
19  Ibid. 
20  Cf. in more detail ibid., pp. 12-20. European Neighbourhood Policy 
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Table 1: State of the EU’s relations with ENP countries. 
Contractual basis  Action Plan  Country
type agreed  in  force 
Country Report 
agreed in  force 
Algeria AA 12/2001  -  -  -  - 
Armenia PCA 04/1996  07/1999  03/2005  -  - 
Azerbaijan PCA  04/1996  07/1999  03/2005  -  - 
Belarus PCA  03/1995  -  -  -  - 
Egypt AA  06/2001  06/2004  03/2005  -  - 
Georgia PCA  04/1996 07/1999 03/2005  -  - 
Israel AA  11/1995  06/2000  05/2004  12/2004  03/2005
Jordan AA  11/1997  05/2002  05/2004  12/2004  06/2005
Lebanon AA  06/2002  03/2003*  03/2005  -  - 
Libya -  -  -  -  -  - 
Moldova PCA 11/1994  07/1998  05/2004  12/2004  02/2005
Morocco AA  02/1996  03/2000  05/2004  12/2004  07/2005
Palestinian 
Authority
AA* 02/1997*  07/1997*  05/2004  12/2004  05/2005
Syria AA  10/2004  -  -  -  - 
Tunisia AA 07/1995  03/1998  05/2004  12/2004  07/2005
Ukraine PCA  06/1994 03/1998 05/2004  12/2004  02/2005
Legend: AA - Association Agreement; PCA - Partnership and Co-operation Agreement. 
* Interim Agreement. 
Data retrieved from http://europa.eu.int. 
multidimensionality. Nonetheless, partners also have a substantial say in 
the conclusion of the Action Plans, since they are actively involved in their 
formulation; the EU as well as neighbours eventually need to adopt the 
plans before implementation can start. By doing so, partners are guaranteed 
an opportunity to address particular national priorities, despite the general Andreas Marchetti 
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framework put in place.
21 The ENP thereby harmonises to a certain extent 
but avoids at the same time being too rigid by flexibly responding to 
neighbours’ individual priorities. 
One of the major innovations in the Union’s relations with neighbouring 
countries consists in the establishment of a unique financial instrument for 
the ENP as a whole. The European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instru-
ment (ENPI) will replace the TACIS and MEDA programmes in 2007.
22
This incorporation of former “neighbourhood instruments” into the ENP-
framework takes place in the overall context of harmonising the EU’s for-
eign policy. As set out in a communication of the Commission in Septem-
ber 2004, the Union will – starting with the Financial Perspective 2007-
2013 – reduce the foreign policy instruments at its disposal from more than 
thirty to six. Besides the remaining Humanitarian Aid Instrument and 
Macro Financial Assistance, four new instruments are being created: The 
Pre-Accession Instrument, the Development Co-operation and Economic 
Co-operation Instrument, the Instrument for Stability, and the already men-
tioned ENPI.
23
Projected Measures and Declared Motives 
The harmonisation of the Union’s foreign policy regimes is one major but 
also very general motive underlying the establishment of the ENP. The de-
sire to generate more coherence via harmonisation derives from the in-
creased awareness that there is a “gap between the EU’s economic weight 
and its political clout”. Therefore, the Union attempts to increase its effi-
ciency and to cut the costs “of a reduced Europe in the field of external re-
21   According to a first assessment of the ENP by Commissioner Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, partners seem to actively use this opportunity to set their particular 
agenda, cf. Commission of the European Communities, Implementing and promot-
ing the European Neighbourhood Policy, SEC(2005)1521, http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/world/enp/documents/sec_2005_1521_en.pdf, [p. 4]. 
22  Even though not included in the ENP-framework, assistance to Russia will also take 
place by the means of the ENPI – just as via TACIS so far. 
23  Cf. Commission of the European Communities, On the Instruments of External As-
sistance under the Future Financial Perspective 2007-2013, COM(2004)626final, 
pp. 7-10. European Neighbourhood Policy 
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lations”
24. The ENP constitutes just one piece in this puzzle. However, 
apart from the general aim of increased coherence within the Union’s for-
eign policy, there exist a variety of measures and motives specifically at-
tached to the ENP. 
As initially mentioned, the motivation of the Union to establish the ENP as 
special policy to govern relations with the Union’s neighbours can be seen 
as twofold: Protect the EU and maintain – or even gain – influence in the 
region. Since the threats the EU faces have changed fundamentally over the 
past 15 years, new approaches to manage them have been developed. In 
this context, the establishment of a new policy towards the EU’s 
neighbours was particularly deemed necessary. This increased importance 
attributed to the Union’s neighbours is basically reflected in four different 
aspects pertaining to the ENP. 
1. The legal foundation envisaged for the ENP is more exclusive than for 
its predecessors. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership – as one of the poli-
cies translated into the ENP – is based on Title V TEU (CFSP) and particu-
larly on Art. 133 TEC (trade and tariffs), Art. 310 TEC (Association 
Agreements), and Art. 308 TEC (MEDA
25). Analogously, relations with 
Russia and countries formerly part of the Soviet Union are governed by 
Title V TEU as well and particularly by Art. 133 TEC, Art. 300 TEC (Part-
nership and Co-operation Agreements), and Art. 308 TEC (TACIS
26). Most 
TEC articles referred to also constitute the foundation for the EU’s devel-
opment policy, that is particularly based on Art. 177-181 TEC, as well as 
Art. 133 TEC (Generalised Scheme of Preferences and Co-operation 
Agreements), Art. 310 TEC (Cotonou and Association Agreements), and 
Art. 308 TEC (ALA
27). In the Constitution for Europe (CEU), however, the 
neighbouring states have now been elevated to a higher level in comparison 
to other third countries: The “Union and its neighbours” are exclusively 
24  Cf. ibid., p. 3. 
25  Cf. Council Regulation (EC) No 2698/2000, OJ L 311, 27 November 2000. 
26   Cf. Council Regulation (EC, EURATOM) No 99/2000, OJ L 12, 29 December 
1999.
27  Cf. Council Regulation (EEC) No 443/92, OJ L 52, 25 February 1992; the regula-
tion refers to Art. 235 TEEC that was changed to Art. 308 TEC in Amsterdam. Andreas Marchetti 
12
dealt with in Art. I-57 CEU. Until now, there has been no particular men-
tion of ENP-countries within the Treaties. The fact that this is envisioned 
provides strong evidence that neighbours are now considered particularly 
relevant. However, besides the special mention, there are no substantially 
new aspects introduced in the Constitution’s neighbourhood article.
28
2. Even though the ratification process for the Treaty establishing a Consti-
tution for Europe is currently undergoing a crisis,
29 the special commitment 
to neighbours manifests itself in denominations newly introduced. The of-
ficial title of the Commissioner for External Relations, Benita Ferrero-
Waldner, has already been changed to “Commissioner for External Rela-
tions and European Neighbourhood Policy”, thereby attributing particular 
attention to neighbours. 
3. The growing interest in the neighbourhood is also evident in a significant 
rise in funds made available to assist partners. The TACIS and MEDA pro-
grammes combined had a volume of approximately 8.5 billion € in the pe-
riod 2000-2006. For the ENPI, almost 15 billion € are foreseen for 2007-
2013.
30
4. Development perspectives of the ENP go well beyond the prospects so 
far formulated in Association Agreements or Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreements. The Union now does not only offer preferential trade or par-
ticipation in a customs union, but also “the prospect of a stake in its Inter-
nal Market and of further economic integration.”
31 The Action Plans 
28  Cf. Barbara Lippert, “Die Union und ihre Nachbarn nach dem Verfassungsvertrag”, 
in: Mathias Jopp/Saskia Matl (eds.), Der Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa: 
Analysen zur Konstitutionalisierung der EU, Europäische Schriften 83, Baden-
Baden: Nomos 2005, pp. 377ff. 
29  A concise summary of the current discourses throughout Europe is provided by 
Nina Eschke/Thomas Malick (eds.), The European Constitution and its Ratification 
Crisis: Constitutional Debates in the EU Member States, Discussion Paper C 156, 
Bonn: ZEI 2006. 
30  In addition, TACIS beneficiaries Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmeni-
stan, and Uzbekistan then will be covered by the Development Co-operation and 
Economic Co-operation Instrument. 
31  The phrase cited is included in all 12 Country Reports so far published, p. 3; cf. as 
well Commission, Wider Europe, as Fn. 15, p. 10 and Commission, European
Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, as Fn. 16, p. 5. European Neighbourhood Policy 
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substantiate this even more by envisaging to move “beyond co-operation to 
a significant degree of integration, including [...] a stake in the EU’s Inter-
nal Market, and the possibility [...] to participate progressively in key as-
pects of EU policies and programmes.”
32 As the EU at present is not 
officially proposing EU-membership to neighbours, these perspectives and 
the increase in funds made available constitute the strongest incentives the 
EU offers to neighbours so far.
33 As the individual priorities of partners are 
equally respected in the Action Plans, the outcome is a Neighbourhood à la 
carte that – with partial integration envisaged – is reminiscent of the all too 
familiar concept of Europe à la carte in a new context, i.e. Europe à la 
carte for non-members. This strongly resembles the concept of privileged 
partnership. As the notion, however, is discredited or at least too strongly 
associated with EU-Turkey relations, documents on ENP avoid it and 
rather speak of “privileged relationship”.
34 Still, the connotations and the 
affinities to “privileged partnership” remain evident. 
Even though it may be argued that the incentives offered are not suffi-
cient,
35 they signify quite far reaching measures on behalf of the EU. To 
understand why the Union does offer them, a closer look at the declared 
motives of the Union deems necessary. 
The European Security Strategy (ESS), adopted by the European Council in 
December 2003, clearly identifies the external challenges the EU expects to 
be confronted with in the future. The awareness of an increased interde-
pendence
36 is clearly visible throughout the document. Albeit large-scale 
aggression against any member state is estimated less likely today, the ESS 
identifies new, increasingly asymmetric threats like terrorism, proliferation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction, active or latent regional conflicts, state 
32  The phrase can be found in all 7 Action Plans so far agreed on, p. 2. 
33  Cf. Roberto Aliboni, “The Geopolitical Implications of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy”, in: European Foreign Affairs Review 10.1 (2005), p. 2. 
34  Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, as Fn. 16, p. 3. 
35   Cf. Kataryna Wolczuk, Ukraine’s European choice, Policy Brief, London: CER 
2004, pp. 3f. 
36  The document even speaks of ”increased European dependence“, A secure Europe 
in a better world: European Security Strategy, http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae 
.pdf, p. 5. Andreas Marchetti 
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failure, and organized crime.
37 Comparing the ESS to unique ENP-
documents, the EU’s assessment remains consistent and the multi-facetted 
diagnosis persists, nonetheless there exists a difference in rhetoric and in-
terpretations of the various phenomena. In general, the ESS is less partner-
oriented and more focused on the EU’s own interests. At least partially, it 
even seems to regard neighbouring states as problematic themselves, 
whereas the ENPSP stresses particularly the interests of partners. Some ex-
amples might be fit to illustrate this difference: Whereas the ESS stresses 
the potential “problems for Europe”
38 if it comes to the neighbourhood, the 
ENPSP rather highlights the “common interests” and underlines the con-
cept of “joint ownership”
39. What appears primarily as threats to the EU in 
the ESS like e.g. “violent conflict, [...] organised crime [...], dysfunctional 
societies or exploding population growth”
40, is also included but rephrased 
in the ENPSP as “increased challenges” that “[p]artners are facing”
41; the 
threats are addressed just as if the ones named would not be among the ma-
jor concerns of the EU as well. In addition, the ENPSP promises “enor-
mous gains to all involved in terms of increased stability, security and well 
being.”
42
If it comes to the neighbours as political entities themselves, the ESS 
speaks of the need of a “ring of well governed countries to the East of the 
European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we 
can enjoy close and cooperative relations.”
43 The repeated emphasis on the 
need to be surrounded by “well-governed”
44 countries implies a clear con-
cept of how the EU expects partners to act and to organise themselves in-
37  Cf. ibid., pp. 5-9. 
38  Ibid., p. 12. 
39  Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, as Fn. 16, p. 8. 
40 European Security Strategy, as Fn. 36, p. 12. 
41  Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, as Fn. 16, p. 16 par-
ticularly refers to „migration pressure from third countries, trafficking in human be-
ings and terrorism.” 
42  Ibid., p. 5 [italics added]. 
43 European Security Strategy, as Fn. 36, p. 13. 
44  Ibid., p. 12. European Neighbourhood Policy 
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ternally.
45 In contrast to this quite demanding conception of the neighbour-
hood in the ESS, most ENP-statements clearly prefer terms like “ring of 
friends”
46 to describe the aspired relationship with ENP-partners, implying 
that the EU and partners are on equal footing. However, what holds true for 
the policies so far in place, holds true for the ENP as well: being funded by 
the EU and distribution of funds being mainly dependent on EU-
satisfaction with the process, the equality exists rather on a rhetorical basis. 
Even an ENP-document, the Commission’s Wider Europe Communication, 
expresses this hierarchy in relations by clearly pointing out that conditions 
– formulated by the EU – need to be met in order to benefit from the new 
policy:
The extension of the benefits [...], including increased financial assistance, 
should be conducted so as to encourage and reward reform – reforms which ex-
isting EU policies and incentives have so far not managed to elicit in all cases. 
Engagement should therefore be introduced progressively, and be conditional
on meeting agreed targets for reform. New benefits should only be offered to 
reflect the progress made by the partner countries in political and economic re-
form. In the absence of progress, partners will not be offered these opportuni-
ties.
47
This particular passage contains a certain contradiction to other ENP-
documents in which the Union stresses that the “EU does not seek to im-
pose priorities or conditions on its partners” and presents the ENP foremost 
as “an offer made by the EU to its partners”.
48 It is certainly important, 
even crucial, to stress the merits for partners, however, in central ENP-
documents, the gains seem somewhat exaggerated and other aspects appear 
to be suppressed to a certain extent. Nonetheless, it looks as if there is an 
45  Karen E. Smith, “The outsiders: the European neighbourhood policy”, in: Interna-
tional Affairs 81.4 (2005), p. 763 rightly identifies a will “to create good 
neighbours”.
46  Cf. e.g. Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Europe’s Neighbours – Towards Closer Integra-
tion, Speech held in Brussels, 22 April 2005, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_ 
relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05_253.htm. 
47  Commission, Wider Europe, as Fn. 15, p. 16 [bold type in original]. 
48  Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, as Fn. 16, p. 8. Andreas Marchetti 
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increasing awareness that without conditionality, the ENP will face the 
same shortcomings as its predecessors.
49
All in all, central EU-documents suggest that however ambitious, co-
operative, and well-meant the ENP is designed, it certainly is far from al-
truistic. On the contrary, the logic behind the EU’s increasing commitment 
towards its neighbours seems to follow a very concise geopolitical logic.
50
In order to grasp the characteristics of this logic, an argument will be elabo-
rated in the next section, deemed fit to explain at least some of the particu-
larities so far mentioned. After all, some questions that arise with regard to 
the conception of the ENP cannot yet be answered satisfactorily. For ex-
ample: Why are the Western Balkan countries considered potential EU-
candidates, whereas Moldova, Ukraine or Georgia – with comparable aspi-
rations – are treated as neighbours for the time being? How come that Ka-
zakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, up to date 
taking part in TACIS, are not transferred to the ENP scheme but shifted to 
development policy? 
The Logic Behind it all: Centre – Periphery Revisited 
The Argument 
The discrepancies between the Union’s official language and the undertone 
in its own documents suggest that at the core of the ENP concept lie geopo-
litical considerations. More precisely, it will be argued that the ENP can be 
understood as a manifestation of the EU’s will to create a ring of states in 
its vicinity to serve its purposes of protecting itself and of exercising influ-
ence. To put it differently, the EU in its function as regional centre
51 in-
49   Cf. in more detail on the aspect of conditionality Michael Emerson/Gergana 
Noutcheva, From Barcelona Process to Neighbourhood Policy: Assessments and 
Open Issues, Working Document 220, Brussels: CEPS 2005, pp. 13-16. 
50  With regard to the Wider Europe Communication of March 2003, Ulrike Guérot/ 
Andrea Witt, “Europas neue Geostrategie”, in: APuZ 54.17 (2004), p. 11 even speak 
of the ”first geo-strategic document“ the Commission has issued [transl. by author]. 
51  Or “regional power“, cf. Antonio Missiroli, “The EU and its changing neighbour-
hood: Stabilization, integration and partnership, in: Roland Dannreuther (ed.), European Neighbourhood Policy 
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tends to create – or maintain – a functioning semi-periphery (via its 
neighbours) in order to create a buffer-zone to the periphery (i.e. the 
neighbours’ neighbours and beyond).
52 As a matter of distinction, the 
neighbours’ neighbours will be labelled “close periphery”, in contrast to 
even more peripheral countries that – for the purpose of the argument – will 
be referred to as “far periphery”. It should be kept in mind, though, that 
both together constitute the periphery, i.e. the argument does not establish a 
functional or qualitative distinction between the two; the only distinction 
made is geographical. 
The outline of the argument with its differentiation between “centre”, “pe-
riphery” and “semi-periphery” is particularly present in neo-Marxist 
thought and especially the works of Immanuel Wallerstein with his concept 
of world-economy.
53 However fit the designations and underlying geopo-
litical assumptions are considered, the neo-Marxist interpretations are be-
lieved to be problematic for two reasons: 
1. Even though the concept of world-economy claims to be universal, the 
supporting argument is purely economic: All phenomena are regarded as 
function of the established world-economy.
54 By doing so, the argument 
remains one-dimensional. Certainly, economy does play an important role, 
however, it is far from dominating all other relevant factors. 
2. The concept of world-economy draws on dependency-theories and ac-
cordingly argues that the centre dominates the periphery and tries to keep it 
in a state of dependency for the better of the centre and the worse of the 
European Union Foreign and Security Policy: Towards a neighbourhood strategy,
London/New York: Routledge 2004, p. 23. 
52   Del Sarto/Schumacher, “From EMP to ENP”, as Fn. 4, pp. 26f. also identify a 
“buffering logic” and a “centre-periphery approach” in the ENP. 
53   Cf. Immanuel Wallerstein, “Tendances et prospectives d’avenir de l’économie-
monde”, in: Bahgat Korany (ed.), Analyse des relations internationales: Approches, 
concepts et données, Montréal: G. Morin 1987, p. 109. A summary of Wallerstein’s 
and other periphery-concepts is provided by Klaus Bürger, Die Euro-Mediterrane 
Partnerschaft als Aufbau einer geopolitischen Semiperipherie? Die Mittelmeerregi-
on im Kontext der regionalen Blockbildung, Berlin 2004, unpublished diploma the-
sis, FU Berlin. 
54  Cf. Wallerstein, “Tendances“, as Fn. 53, p. 108. Andreas Marchetti 
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periphery.
55 However, with the collapse of the bipolar world order and 
globalisation spreading, international politics seem to be less and less struc-
tured by dependencies, but rather by interdependencies: Even though there 
exists a gap between centre and periphery, the periphery also exercises a 
considerable influence on the centre – even if this might primarily be in 
terms of security.
56
Therefore, the state of relations between centre and periphery can be re-
garded as interdependent and asymmetric. They are interdependent because 
of reciprocal influences exercised and asymmetric because of the different 
levels of development – politically as well as economically. 
Even though the EU is believed to actively build up a semi-periphery, the 
argument developed here does not imply that the EU’s approach is intended 
to impair the semi-periphery as Wallerstein would surely argue. To the 
contrary, under the conditions of interdependency and asymmetry the es-
tablishment of the ENP might eventually create a win-win-situation for 
both sides in the mid-term: In some part because of the EU’s policy – act-
ing selfish in the sense Adam Smith would have used the term – the semi-
periphery is considerably strengthened and gains additional options for ac-
tion.
57 This might even apply to the periphery in the long-run since more 
stable semi-peripheral zones will be likely to try to stabilize their 
neighbourhood respectively. 
Supporting evidence 
Over the past years, the EU has accorded increased attention to its 
neighbours, or, to phrase it differently, the EU has developed an increased 
interest in a more effective policy towards neighbouring countries. Accord-
ingly, with regard to the ENP, the EU now seems to believe less in the te-
dious logic of political spill-over from economic advancement and more in 
55  Cf. ibid., p. 111. 
56  Cf. Thomas Jäger, Isolation in der internationalen Politik, Baden-Baden: Nomos 
1996, p. 27. 
57  Cf.  Benita  Ferrero-Waldner, The European Neighbourhood Policy: helping our-
selves through helping our neighbours, Speech held in London, 31 October 2005, 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05_31-10-05.htm.European Neighbourhood Policy 
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the measurable quid pro quo of trade-offs. The addressee of this policy is a 
clearly identifiable ring of neighbours that is defined by socio-economical 
and geographical factors. 
The socio-economic evidence for the semi-periphery assumption lies in ba-
sic characteristics of the neighbours in relation to their international envi-
ronment. Taking the Gross National Income (GNI) per capita as indicator 
to compare certain groups of countries socio-economically, neighbours are 
located in between the EU and the close periphery (see Graph 1). Since the 
potential candidates – displaying comparable data as neighbours – are es-
teemed to eventually join the Union, the neighbours will remain the only 
group, socio-economically located between the EU and the close periphery. 
Graph 1: Average GNI per capita for different groups of countries (current USD), 2004. 
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As today’s potential candidates will progress socio-economically with ac-
cession, there is also a need for the EU to increase its assistance to 
neighbours considerably so that they – from a European standpoint – can 
effectively fit in their role as semi-periphery, i.e. serve as a buffer if it 
comes to economic migration or other phenomena. If the gap between 
neighbours and the EU became too large in comparison to the gap existing 
between neighbours and the periphery, the buffer-function would inevitably 
decrease. Therefore, the projected rise in assistance to neighbours from 8.5 
billion € to 15 billion € supports the semi-periphery and thereby assures its 
function for the EU. 
Geographically, the countries now included in the ENP literally provide for 
a ring around the EU. They form a continuous band of countries
58 from the 
Maghreb to the Mashrek, via Turkey
59 and the Southern Caucasus over the 
Black Sea to the Western CIS-countries to finally touch back on today’s 
EU in the East (see map). Politically speaking, there are concrete indica-
tions that the neighbouring countries are indeed perceived as buffers that 
shall prevent negative developments to reach the EU: Renewed plans to 
establish refugee camps on the soil of ENP-countries
60 fit into this logic 
and provide strong evidence for the assumed semi-periphery logic. 
Russia constitutes a special case. It does not fit into the concept of semi-
periphery because of the genesis of some neighbours and its own geo-
graphic location. Some neighbours were formerly part of the Soviet Union 
and have explicitly oriented themselves towards the EU in the meantime. 
Bearing this in mind, they would probably consider it an affront if they 
were put in one category together with their former “hegemon”. On the 
other hand, Russia’s regional importance, as well as its political and eco-
nomic weight, necessitate preferential treatment. In a certain sense, Russia 
can be regarded as semi-centre, as it does take over most of the functions of 
a semi-peripheral  state but  at the same time  displays  more  features of  a 
58  Aliboni, “Geopolitical Implications”, as Fn. 33, speaks of a “geopolitical arc”, Mi-
chael Emerson, The Wider Europe as the European Union’s Friendly Monroe Doc-
trine, Policy Brief 27, Brussels: CEPS 2002, p. 13 speaks of a continuous “chain”. 
59  On Turkey’s special position in this context see p. 23. 
60  Cf. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 December 2005, p. 5. European Neighbourhood Policy 
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centre than any other semi-peripheral country. Last but not least, consider-
ing Russia as buffer would mean the establishment of countries like Mon-
golia, China or even North Korea as close periphery; countries rather 
considered far peripheral or – as in the case of China – regional centres 
themselves. Therefore, it makes sense that Russia is not included in the 
ENP not only because Russia itself prefers a preferential treatment
61 but 
also because it would not smoothly fit into the semi-periphery the EU es-
tablishes.
These considerations might well explain why none of the Central Asian 
CIS countries – sharing no border with the EU – are included in the ENP. 
EU-assistance to these countries will be transferred from TACIS – and 
thereby from the ENP – to Development Co-operation and Economic Co-
operation.
62 By doing so, it is clearly expressed that they are now consid-
ered peripheral. 
On the other hand, many countries geographically neighbouring the EU are 
not included in the ENP.
63 Western European non-EU-members have al-
ready established special relations to the EU and – more importantly – do 
not fulfil the function of buffers, neither socio-economically, nor geo-
graphically. Economically, they are even better off than most EU-members 
and geographically, they do not touch on the periphery. Consequently, they 
do not take part in the ENP. The same holds true for the countries that are 
currently candidates or at least potentially considered as such. Their ac-
knowledged eligibility for membership – even though their joining the Un-
ion might still take more than a decade – makes them unfit to serve as 
buffers in the meantime. Therefore, the semi-periphery is already designed 
around them. This certainly implies that the EU, by making clear distinc-
tions between those regarded as future members and those considered 
neighbours, has somehow already pre-decided – at least for the moment – 
on the ins and outs, i.e. on the finalité géographique of the EU. Conse-
quently, Turkey – a long-time member of the EMP – is no longer included 
61  Cf. Comelli, “Challenges“, as Fn. 12, p. 101. 
62  In addition, Mongolia, TACIS beneficiary from 1991 to 2003, is already covered by 
ALA.
63  See Fn. 13. European Neighbourhood Policy 
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in the ENP. However, there prevail some problematic aspects with regard 
to the semi-periphery concept if it comes to Turkey or to other ENP coun-
tries.
Delicate Features 
The semi-periphery logic as organising principle of the ENP becomes also 
evident ex negativo in the ongoing discussions on Turkey’s eligibility for 
EU-membership because one of the frequently used arguments against 
Turkish membership implicitly draws back on this logic: With Turkey en-
tering, the EU would have a common border with Iran or even Iraq. One of 
the obstacles to Turkey’s aspirations therefore is just that it’s membership 
would thwart the concept of a continuous semi-periphery, designed to “pro-
tect” the EU from “problematic countries”, since it would interrupt the 
“ring of friends” by breaking up the semi-peripheral cordon and establish a 
direct geographical link to the periphery.
64 On the other hand, this might 
likewise be considered an asset as former enlargement Commissioner 
Günter Verheugen expressed it: “at the latest with the accession of Turkey 
the EU will become a world wide player”
65 because the Union would fi-
nally enter into a new geographic arena with high international relevance. 
While the Central Asian CIS-countries are degraded from neighbours to 
development countries, even some Eastern ENP-partners have reason to 
feel degraded by their current classification. Despite the positive aspects 
stressed by the EU, in partners’ perceptions there are strong negative con-
notations as well: The Wider Europe Communication
66, as well as the 
ENPSP
67, do not grant ENP-partners an EU-membership perspective and 
exclude them from the provisions of Art. 49 TEU governing accession – at 
least in the medium-term.
68 The EU merely “acknowledges” the “European 
64  Cf. Aliboni, “Geopolitical Implications”, as Fn. 33, p. 6. 
65  Günter Verheugen, “Das Kuschel-Europa ist von gestern: Ein Beitritt der Türkei 
würde die Europäische Union stärken und sie zum weltpolitischen Akteur machen“, 
in: Die Zeit, 7 October 2004, http://www.zeit.de/2004/42/Erbe?page=all.  
66  Cf. Commission, Wider Europe, as Fn. 15, p. 5. 
67  Cf. Commission; European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, as Fn. 16, p. 3. 
68  Cf. Commission, Wider Europe, as Fn. 15, p. 5. Andreas Marchetti 
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aspirations”
69 of ENP-countries expressing the wish to join but does not 
support them as in the case of the Balkans.
70 However, Belarus, Ukraine, 
and Moldova as well as Georgia might eventually have a chance to enter, 
because, geographically speaking, the membership of the former three 
would not really destroy the concept of a semi-periphery since Russia as 
semi-centre overtakes these functions just as well. Georgia appears to be a 
somewhat more delicate case in this respect since it can be argued that a 
Georgian EU-membership might a) foster similar aspirations in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan, b) weaken the buffer zone in the Caucasus as Armenia and 
Azerbaijan may not be regarded sufficient to effectively exercise the func-
tion of a semi-periphery and c) geographically be considered too far reach-
ing since Georgia is not directly linked to the EU.
71
Additional evidence that the EU considers the Eastern ENP countries more 
as semi-periphery rather than as potential candidates lies in the equal inclu-
sion of Mediterranean countries in the ENP, generally not regarded eligible 
for EU-membership.
72 All this is at least problematic in the sense that most 
Eastern partners regard the ENP as a first step towards membership. From 
their standpoint, the transfer of the “open-ended” TACIS into the ENP 
framework is disillusioning.
73 The EU will eventually have to make a 
choice: either destroy expectancies that facilitate partners’ participation in 
the ENP or continue to nourish hopes that the EU evidently is not willing to 
fulfil.
69 Proposed EU/Moldova Action Plan, http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/     
action_plans/Proposed_Action_Plan_EU-Moldova.pdf, p. 1; Proposed EU/Ukraine 
Action Plan, http://europa.eu.int/comm/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/Proposed_
Action_Plan_EU-Ukraine.pdf , p. 1. 
70  Cf. European Security Strategy, p. 13. 
71  Only Turkey – candidate itself – could eventually serve as a “bridge“. 
72  Cf. e.g. the case of Morocco referred to in Fn. 8 as well as Commission, Wider 
Europe, as Fn. 15, p. 5. 
73  Cf. Smith, “The outsiders”, as Fn. 45, p. 768f. European Neighbourhood Policy 
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Consequences and Implications 
The ENP as one of the Union’s most recent policy schemes is fashioned to 
adapt the EU’s foreign policy to the already mentioned dominant phenom-
ena of globalisation: 
1. The increased interdependency is often mainly perceived in negative 
terms since it becomes most evident in the growing vulnerability of the 
centre, leading to an eventual dissolution of the distinction between do-
mestic and external security.
74 Hence, security has become a very com-
plex issue and former security concepts no longer apply because they 
have become ineffective.
75
2. The centre’s vulnerability becomes even more concrete due to the asym-
metries existing between the centre and the periphery, generating ten-
sions and threats. Albeit asymmetry can also generate incentives for 
innovation and progress, this seems only to be true up to a certain level. 
If asymmetries become too pronounced, tensions eventually rise. 
Under these conditions of interdependency and asymmetry, the EU faces 
the dilemma to maintain an open and prosperous society while doing the 
utmost to protect it effectively. The ENP constitutes part of the solution to 
this dilemma because its underlying logic incorporates both aspects: 
1. In the short-term, the establishment of a semi-periphery via the ENP 
will create a buffer to the periphery that will eventually enhance the 
EU’s protection; 
2. In the medium-term, the ENP, by strengthening neighbours, will con-
tribute to a decrease in asymmetries and therefore enable the EU to 
maintain a certain level of openness and enhance its security and pros-
perity further. 
The combination of the two aspects is crucial for the ENP’s success be-
cause only opting for short-term security might merely postpone negative 
74  Cf. Guérot/Witt, “Europas neue Geostrategie“, as Fn. 50, p. 7. 
75  Cf. Andreas Jacobs/Carlo Masala, “Vom Mare Nostrum zum Mare Securum: Si-
cherheitspolitische Entwicklungen im Mittelmeerraum und die Reaktionen von EU 
und NATO“, in: APuZ. 49.17 (1999), pp. 29f. Andreas Marchetti 
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effects but not diminish them since tensions would eventually rise.
76 It is to 
hope that these short-term effects do not encourage politically motivated 
windfall gains. A comprehensive policy has to combine protective and co-
operative measures, i.e. it needs to apply co-operative constraint. One of 
the reasons for doing so in the ENP is that the EU cannot have an interest 
in growing asymmetries because the costs of assuring the own benefits in-
crease with a rise in asymmetries. The higher the differences are, the higher 
are the costs to maintain just these differences – the lesser the differences, 
the smaller the costs. Therefore, the EU has a vital interest in lessening the 
differences. This will, however, not lead to equalling out the differences 
but lead to an equilibrium between profits and costs: adjustment takes place 
until the maintenance costs are equal to or less than the – perceived – gains. 
In order to prevent the emergence of long-time negative effects that might 
fall back on the centre, the centre eventually needs to offer sustainable 
positive effects to the semi-periphery. Dependency concepts tend to ignore 
this part of the equation, i.e. they neglect the semi-periphery’s projected 
lasting profits or see them merely negatively as function of the centre’s will 
to dominate. 
Besides, the costs of exclusion arise on both sides. Accordingly, the semi-
periphery itself is interested in a privileged relationship to the centre. If the 
centre’s costs for exclusion are high, the semi-periphery’s costs to get ac-
cess to the centre are also high.
77 The ENP, especially by offering partners 
to participate in the EU’s internal market, enables the semi-periphery to cut 
their access costs. This will grant partners more opportunities to develop, 
helping them to better cope with the effects of globalisation themselves. In 
the long-run, the semi-periphery itself might acquire an ability to develop 
its own neighbours, because the deadweight losses in relations to them are 
likely to become too pronounced as well. This is not to argue that there will 
76  Besides, only opting for protection by establishing a “fortress Europe” would not 
correspond to the EU’s founding principles; practising such a policy large-scale 
would probably not be accepted within the EU, as can be guessed of public reac-
tions to the problems Spain was particularly confronted with in its African exclaves 
Melilla and Ceuta in 2005. 
77  In practical terms: the costs for market access, movement of people etc. European Neighbourhood Policy 
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be a snowball-effect, but rather a balance of efforts to maintain or increase 
security and prosperity by exclusion and to maintain or increase them by 
participation.
Outlook 
The European Neighbourhood Policy is designed to establish a semi-
periphery around the European Union. This functionalisation of neighbours 
has the advantage of buffering and protecting by at the same time allowing 
for an increased exchange between the entities involved. The ENP as for-
eign policy scheme therefore functions in two directions: As the EU creates 
firmer links to its semi-periphery in order to stabilise it, it actively supports 
and strengthens it. The application of this sort of co-operative constraint is 
in the vital interest of the EU, because it enables the Union to acquire secu-
rity and maintain or even gain a certain level of regional influence. But it is 
also in the interest of partners. They profit considerably of their geographic 
proximity. The Union is therefore right to stress the positive points but it 
should not shy away from revealing its own interests as it currently does. 
The EU shall particularly acknowledge how far it is willing to go, espe-
cially if it comes to concrete membership aspirations of ENP-partners. An 
all too altruistic-looking policy seems unrealistic and therefore not trust-
worthy. Regardless of how tempting it might appear to the EU, promising 
or even just implying more than it wants to deliver might prove counter-
productive in the end.
78 This is evidently a difficult task, especially as un-
der the conditions of asymmetry partners tend to feel deprived when it 
comes to the allocation of benefits from co-operation.
79 A substantial in-
crease in these benefits for partners could be generated by 1) strengthening 
inter-neighbour co-operation and 2) increasing consistency in the EU’s for-
eign policy. 
78  Cf. also Guérot/Witt, “Europas neue Geostrategie“, as Fn. 50, p. 12. 
79  Cf. Andreas Jacobs, “Interregionale Kooperation: Ein systemorientiertes Analyse-
modell“, in: Carlo Masala/Ralf Roloff (eds.), Herausforderungen der Realpolitik: 
Beiträge zur Theoriedebatte in der Internationalen Politik, Kölner Arbeiten zur In-
ternationalen Politik 8, Cologne: SH-Verlag 1998, p. 122. Andreas Marchetti 
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1. With a perspective of participation in the common market, intra-regional 
co-operation will have to be reinforced since the various bilateral links of 
partners to the EU alone will not be sufficient for realisation. However, the 
regional dimension within the ENP is underdeveloped.
80 The major obsta-
cle lies in the heterogeneity of ENP-partners.
81 Thus, the EU should in-
creasingly support intra-regional efforts, as for example the Black Sea 
Economic Co-operation or the Agadir Process. Even focussing only on the 
regional dimension would correspond to Europe’s approach in other re-
gions.
82 However, as the neighbours are geopolitically more relevant, the 
EU cannot afford to have non-relations with any of the countries surround-
ing it,
83 even if these might not intend to strengthen inter-neighbour ties. 
Nonetheless, for a raise in profits of the ENP to occur, the partners have to 
live up to expectations and things are not only up to Europe. 
2. As the ENP only constitutes a small portion of the EU’s foreign policy, it 
has to be placed in a broader context. Obviously, it is merely a policy that 
governs relations at the periphery of the Union. There exist other schemes 
that operate in the periphery. Under the conditions of interdependency and 
asymmetry, the pressure continuously rises to also abolish contradictions in 
EU-policies related to these schemes in due course. For example, the EU’s 
development co-operation can only become efficient if the Union funda-
mentally alters its Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) that ruins develop-
ment efforts manifold. Fortunately, one might say, the antagonisms are 
beginning to break up within the EU: With new financial exigencies or EU-
candidate Turkey potentially zeroing in on participating in CAP, demands 
run high to substantially reform this expensive policy, i.e. to cut subsidies 
and to reduce protectionism. Thereby, the Union could strengthen the ef-
80  Most of the funds made available via the ENPI will be dispersed on a bilateral basis. 
81  Cf. Aliboni, “Geopolitical Implications”, as Fn. 33, p. 2. 
82  In Latin America, for example, the EU envisages to negotiate Association Agree-
ments only with the regional bodies (i.e. SICA and CAN) and not bilaterally with 
their respective member states, cf. Martin Zimmek, Integrationsprozesse in Latein-
amerika: Aktuelle Herausforderungen in Mittelamerika und der Andenregion, Dis-
cussion Paper C 153, Bonn: ZEI 2005, p. 20. 
83 Thus the ”differentiated bilateralism“ on behalf of the EU as described by Del 
Sarto/Schumacher, ”From EMP to ENP“, as Fn. 4, pp. 21f. European Neighbourhood Policy 
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fects of its development policy as part of its foreign policy since “many de-
veloping countries enjoy a comparative advantage in agricultural produc-
tion.”
84 With liberalisation, this advantage could be exploited and then be 
translated into an overall increase in prosperity,
85 resulting in a reduction of 
the differences between centre and periphery. 
The EU needs to further elaborate an overall strategy. The ENP seems to be 
a step in the right direction, however, in the long run, this will not be suffi-
cient. For example, the ENP will not fundamentally change the situation of 
asylum seekers or refugees in Northern Africa who want to enter the EU. 
The EU must in fact strive for a policy that “involves getting rid of the 
problems at its source”
86. A change in the EU’s development policy and in 
its CAP-regime are therefore needed. First, albeit small, steps can already 
be identified: CAP-expenditures have at least already been limited. From 
discussions on a cut in e.g. milk-subsidies, it can be anticipated that a sub-
stantial reform of CAP – or likewise structural policies – will certainly 
make up for future crises the EU will inevitably have to go through. 
Focussing one more time on the ENP, the discussion of this policy has re-
vealed an EU continuously maturing in terms of foreign policy: Although 
the EU currently “discovers” its neighbours, it seems to know quite well 
how to treat these “discoveries”. The establishment of the ENP as Euro-
pean semi-periphery with active involvement of neighbours proves once 
more the strength and the attractiveness of the all too often underestimated 
European Union. After all, it is one of the only players creating such an at-
tractive force. Hence, with over fifty years of integration and crisis man-
agement experience, the European Union seems to be one of the regions 
best prepared for the coming decades – the ENP is just an expression of the 
Union’s ability and determination to play an ever more important role. 
84    Klaus Frohberg/Ulrich Hiemenz, Agricultural Trade Liberalization: Stumbling 
Block of the “Doha Round”?, Policy Brief 4, Bonn: ZEF 2005, p. 3. 
85   Along the mechanism described by L. Alan Winters/Neil McCulloch/Andrew 
McKay, Trade Liberalisation and Poverty: The Empirical Evidence, Discussion 
Papers in Economics 88, Brighton: University of Sussex 2002, p. 5. 
86  Ashkaan Rahimi, The Evolution of EU Asylum Policy, Discussion Paper C 142, 
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